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USIB-D-33, 4/5
3 February 1959

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Soviet Allocation of Responsibility for Guided Missiles

Reference: USIB-M-18, item 9; USIB-M-19, item 1

1. The attached report on the subordination of the various missile systems in the Soviet guided missile program, prepared by GMAIC* pursuant to instructions of the Intelligence Board on 30 December, is forwarded for review.

2. At present we plan to place this matter on the agenda of the 10 February Intelligence Board meeting for discussion and action on the recommendation of GMAIC.



JOHN HEIRES
Executive Secretary

* On 3 February the Intelligence Board approved the draft DCID 3/4, as amended, which changed the name of the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) to "Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee" (GMAIC).

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GUIDED MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Soviet Allocation of Responsibility for Guided Missiles (C)

REFERENCE : USIB Minutes of Meeting, Item 9, 30 December 1958, ~~SECRET~~

1. As instructed by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC) has reviewed all known evidence concerning the subordination of the various missile systems in the Soviet guided missile program. The volume of evidence related to this problem is considerable, particularly with respect to surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. The bulk, but certainly not all, of the evidence is from open literature such as the press, Soviet military periodicals and from statements by responsible Soviet officials.

2. From examination of all available evidence, we believe that the Ministry of Defense, under the direction of the Council of Ministers, probably controls all phases of the Soviet guided missile program. There is very little information on the entire subject of the detailed

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and specific subordination of the various missile systems.*

3. The bulk of available evidence indicates that at least with respect to the development of ground launched, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles of all ranges, the Main Artillery Directorate, which is responsible directly to the Ministry of Defense, is the organization of primary concern. It should be noted that the Main Artillery Directorate is an organization unique to the Soviets in that it serves all arms of the military and not just the ground forces. We believe this directorate of the Soviet armed forces also probably exercises control over all aspects of these missiles from conception to certain technical aspects of deployment. In the operational sense, we believe that planning for the deployment and employment of these missiles is a responsibility of the Minister of Defense and his general staff, although the details of operational control are unknown. We have a high degree of confidence that the shorter range ballistic missile units are manned by artillery troops. Although there is less conclusive evidence on the longer range ballistic missile units, we believe

* The NSA member of GMIC reserves his position of this and all subsequent paragraphs.

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they are probably manned by artillery troops.*

4. There is a lesser body of evidence which we believe indicates that the Main Artillery Directorate exercises control over all aspects of ground launched surface-to-air missiles from conception to certain technical aspects of deployment. In the operational sense we believe that the deployment of these missiles is probably coordinated by the Air Defense of the Country (PVO STRANY). We believe ground launched surface-to-air units are manned by artillery troops assigned to PVO STRANY, groups of forces, military districts and naval fleets.

5. With regard to all other missile systems (cruise types, etc.), evidence is insufficient to allow a determination as to subordination during the development phase. However, we believe the operational control is exercised by the using arms.

* The Air Force member of GMIC does not concur in the conclusions of this paragraph. He believes that the available evidence is far too tenuous and contradictory regarding certain aspects of the Soviet missile program to support a conclusion at this time.

It is agreed that the overall operational control of the Soviet missile program is exercised at the Ministry of Defense level. This is in accord with Soviet organization and doctrine for armed forces. Further, there is general agreement concerning the operational responsibility for some of the missile programs (viz: naval and air launched and shorter range surface-to-surface).

Responsibility for the operational employment of the longer range missiles, however, is less clear. In view of the conflicting evidence (and varied interpretations thereof) and until more reliable information becomes available, it is considered imprudent to arrive at any decision regarding the subordination of longer range Soviet ballistic missiles which could possibly result in a misdirection of collection efforts.

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6. This Committee has not investigated the effects of the above conclusions on the collection effort and is not prepared to make recommendations in this area.

7. It is recommended that USIB approve the conclusions in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5.*

/s/

EARL McFARLAND, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Chairman, GMIC

29 January 1959

* The Chairman, GMIC, believes that the Board was immediately concerned with the effects of subordination of the Soviet missile program on US collection efforts. The Chairman has investigated this phase; in addition, he considers that, in general, the evidence is not as positive as indicated in the majority view, and that it definitely is not firm concerning the longer range ballistic missiles.

He does believe, however, that the operational responsibility for some of the programs which is obvious (e.g., naval and air launched and the shorter range surface-to-surface missiles) has been and should continue to be used as a partial basis for orienting the collection and analysis efforts.

Knowledge of the subordination during the R&D phase would probably have little or no effect on the results of our collection efforts.

He considers the responsibility for operational employment of the longer range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to be too uncertain for use as an aid for sharpening the collection and analysis efforts. In fact, he considers there is so much doubt concerning the responsibility of the artillery that any increased concentration on this arm could and possibly would lessen the amount of information on the operational phase of these longer range ballistic missiles.

He therefore recommends that concentration not be made at this time on the artillery as a means for aiding the collection and analysis efforts concerning the longer range ballistic missiles.

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